The proof of existence of a Collateral Equilibrium (with a Leontief utility function), in Ma (2015) is not constructive.
The two theorems of relevance for this claim are Theorems 1 and 2, p. 23 (ibid).
The proof of the first theorem is given in the Appendix (pp. 23-26) , and relies heavily (as the author candidly admits 1 ) on the 'technique of proof' given in Dubey et. al. (2005) .
This theorem is non-constructive for at least four mathematical reasons: Theorem 2, apart from relying on the result that is Theorem 1, is more glaringly non-constructive in the following two senses:
i. It invokes an undecidable disjunction in the form of an appeal to the non-constructive Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem (p. 13, opening paragraph of the proof of Theorem 2).
1 'The technique of proof used here is analogous to that of Dubey et. al. (2005) '. Unfortunately the author also reproduces that pure existence proof -i.e., non-constructive (and non-effective or non-computable) -almost verbatim, in crucial places (cf. in particular, ibid, p. 25).
2 But Dubey et.al. (op.cit) make no constructive claims for their proof, and for invoking the nonconstructive -indeed, unconstructifiable -Kakutani fixed point theorem.
ii. In using the technique of proof by contradiction, hence invoking the law of doublenegation, in non-finite cases (the second paragraph of the proof of Theorem 2, p. 13).
Finally, in characterizing an auxiliary economy ( § 5.1, pp. 14-15), 'to facilitate computation' -essentially to devise an algorithm, the author appeals to:
A 'construction' of 'smooth and positive functions' (first paragraph of § 5.1) 3 .
II.
The appeal to what the author refers to as the 'KKT conditions of each household' (ibid, p. 15), which are non-constructive.
These two reasons, at the least, invalidate the claim that the algorithm is effective (even in the narrow sense defined by the author). No such algorithm, relying on the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, can be shown to be 'effective by the accuracy of the equilibrium it provided'. 4 We would like to end this brief note by expressing our adherence to Fred Richman's important observation (Richman, op. cit, p. 125 ; italics added):
"Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreciation of the thoroughgoing algorithmic thinking that is required for a constructive proof. ...... I would guess that most realist mathematicians are unable even to recognize when a proof is constructive in the intuitionist's sense.
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a theorem depends on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have often been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware whether or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must be used, in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded middle [LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distinguish between different formulations of a theorem that are trivially equivalent given LEM, although one formulation may have a constructive proof and the other not."
